The recent subprime mortgage crisis has brought to the forefront the possibility of discriminatory lending. Many -including groups like the NAACP -claim that women and minorities were disproportionately awarded subprime rates on their home purchase loans. Using the millions of observations collected by the federal government in 2006 through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, this paper explores these claims causally. In so doing, the paper explores two possible theories of discrimination: (1) that any discriminatory lending patterns are picking up the fact that minority borrowers went to different lenders, perhaps as a result of predatory lending, and (2) the possibility that individual lenders discriminated against identically situated borrowers. The results presented here provide evidence for both types of discrimination, but only in certain regions of the country and only for certain minority groups.
"[A] lot of us who are older than 30 have some memory of disappointment or humiliation related to banks. The white guy in the suit with the same income gets a loan and you don't? So you turn to local brokers, even if they don't offer the best rates." -Colvin Grannum, President, Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation 1
On March 12, 2009, the NAACP filed a lawsuit against several mortgage lending companies.
Their claims were straightforward: they argued that African-American borrowers were up to thirty percent more likely than white borrowers to receive unfavorable lending terms in their mortgage loans. This, they claimed, amounted to nothing more than racial discrimination, and was unlawful under the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act, and the U.S. Constitution. More recently, the NAACP has been joined in other jurisdictions by various state and local governments, among them the cities of Memphis and Baltimore, as well as the state of Illinois. Time will tell whether these lawsuits will be successful, but one thing is certain: these litigants are hardly alone in thinking that minorities were disproportionately (and perhaps intentionally) affected by the subprime mortgage lending crisis. Allegations that companies targeted vulnerable populations -recent immigrants, non-English speakers, single mothers, African Americans, etc. -are abundant, and effectively borne out by the swaths of foreclosures currently gripping minority neighborhoods. This anecdotal evidence, in turn buttressed by media coverage and political finger pointing, suggests that groups like the NAACP might be right. This paper uses 2006 data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to explore these claims. The paper departs from the existing literature on discrimination in lending in two important ways. First, while some previous work has found correlations between subprime lending and race and gender, this paper takes a causal approach by applying exact matching techniques within the context of the Rubin potential outcomes framework (Greiner and Rubin (2010) ). To this extent, the paper attempts to answer whether a borrower's race or gender actually caused him or her to receive a subprime loan.
Second, this causal approach allows the paper to gain traction on the kinds of discriminatory mechanisms in effect. When it comes to subprime lending, there are two basic hypothesis:
1. Individual discrimination. Minority borrowers and white borrowers might have actually gone to the same lenders. Any differences in subprime lending would therefore suggest that lenders are treating identically situated borrowers differently, perhaps because of their race or gender.
2. Structural discrimination. Minority borrowers and white borrowers sought out different lenders -perhaps because of predatory lending practices but also, perhaps, because different social and professional networks. Because minority and white borrowers went to different lenders, and because different lenders will offer distinct products and services, it is possible that minority borrowers ended up with more subprime loans.
Untangling the effects of each type of discrimination is difficult, but it is possible to gain traction on the question by leveraging the fact that the federal government routinely collects data at the lending agency level. As such, conditioning on the specific agency allows us to explore directly whether individual discrimination occurred, while disregarding the identity of the agency allows us to estimate a measure of structural and individual discrimination combined -a holistic measure of discrimination. To this extent, the paper hopes to provide a clear example where different types of discrimination can, in fact, be quantitatively measured.
The paper also considers how sensitive the preliminary results are to unmeasured potential confounding variables. This is a particularly important question in the lending context, as many of the key data -including credit scores, employment histories, and debt obligations -are highly proprietary and are not collected by the federal government. Any conclusions are thus subject to the critique that missing confounders -not racial or gender discrimination -are driving the results.
By analyzing the sensitivity of the results to missing confounders, however, the paper addresses these potential criticisms proactively, and also provides a model for future statistical work dealing with unavailable or closely-guarded data. This paper will proceed as follows. Part I will provide an overview of recent research on these issues, noting how this paper reinforces and departs from previous work. Part II will discuss the data used in this project, which are data collected by the federal government in 2006 pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Part III will describe the methodology behind the analysis, noting in particular the causal inference mechanisms at work in the lending context. Part IV will present the results, while Part V will discuss the potential role of unobserved confounders.
The paper will conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of this analysis and will also highlight areas of future research.
What We Know About Discrimination and Lending
Social science theories of discrimination have largely focused on individual attitudes. Does an employer discriminate between black and white job applicants (Fryer Jr and Levitt (2004), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) )? Are white voters willing to vote for a black politician (Hopkins (2009) 
To this extent, models of discrimination have largely focused on individuals, their attitudes, and their prejudices (e.g., Becker (1971) , Myrdal and Bok (1996) ). Less well measured -particularly within political science -has been discrimination based on broader, structural considerations.
Consider the employment example. A woman job applicant might be discriminated against when applying to the same job as a similarly qualified male applicant. But the same worker could also choose to apply only to companies that actively recruit women candidates like her. Thus, she could be discriminated against not just once, but twice. Both actions constitute discrimination colloquially understood, but both have different causes, consequences, and legal and policy solutions. Social scientists have understood this conceptual distinction in areas as such as education, labor relations (Frymer (2005) ), and law, but measuring and distinguishing these discriminatory mechanisms quantitatively has mostly proved elusive.
The personal finance industry is another area where individual-level and structural discrimination are widely thought to exist. Strong anecdotal evidence points to structural discrimination (particularly in the form of predatory lending -e.g., Kirchoff (2005) , Blanton (2007), Powell and Roberts (2009) ), while others believe that discrimination at the individual level might have played a significant role (e.g., the NAACP). There is no question that distinguishing between the two discriminatory mechanisms is important. Legal analysts and lawyers will care a great deal more about individual discrimination, as it forms a basis for potentially successful claims under anti-discrimination law (including under the U.S. Constitution). On the other hand, politicians, community advocates, and local officials might care just as much (if not more) about instances of predatory lending or firms targetting certain groups. Indeed, individual discrimination might have an easy redress in the courts, but structural discrimination might be more pernicious and require greater levels of regulatory oversight and governmental involvement.
Teasing apart the potential role that structural and individual discrimination play in any given issue area is, however, quite difficult. The empirical research into the home-buying industry has, for the most part, muddled the issue, pointing to a strong relationship between minority status and subprime lending without disaggregating potential discriminatory mechanisms. For example, a number of studies have relied on survey data, which allows researchers access to sensitive private information -for example, credit scores, employment histories, etc. Nonetheless, this kind of data do not allow researchers to distinguish between structural mechanisms versus discrimination happening at the individual level. Barr, Dokko and Keys (2007) , for example, examine data from low-to moderate-income communities around the Detroit area, finding that, even within similarly situated low-income neighborhoods, African-American borrowers were more likely to report having loans with punitive or high-cost terms -such as ballooning interest rates or prepayment penalties.
Other studies relying on survey data include Lax et al. (2004) and Courchane, Surette and Zorn (2004) , both of which find that minority status is positively correlated with receiving a subprime loan.
Another subset of studies on this point have relied on proprietary data (including credit scores and employment histories) that are not collected by the federal government. Perhaps the most far-reaching is Bocian, Ernst and Li (2008) , which combined 2004 HMDA data with a proprietary database including credit scores, resulting in a database of approximately 120,000 observations. Using logit and least square regressions on this combined database, the authors find that being African American and Hispanic is closely correlated with a higher likelihood of receiving a subprime loan.
The authors do not, however, explore whether this provides evidence for individual-level discrimination or if it is a "by-product" of different borrowers going to different lenders. Other studies have looked at similar proprietary data and have likewise have found correlations between concentrations of minorities and subprime lending activity (e.g., Williams, Nesiba and McConnell (2005) , Calem, Gillen and Wachter (2004) , Taylor, Silver and Berenbaum (2004) , Mayer and Pence (2008) ). A strong exception to this line of research is Haughwout, Mayer and Tracy (2009) , which finds no evidence of any kind of discrimination against minority borrowers.
Also worth mentioning are the large number of unpublished studies and reports commissioned by non-profit and community advocacy organizations. California Reinvestment Coalition et al. (Unpublished 2009) , for example, looked at subprime lending in minority communities and concluded that subprime lending is by far more prevalent in areas covered by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), a federal law encouraging lending to minorities. Other studies along these lines include Bocian, Ernst and Li (2006) , Apgar and Calder (2005) , and Bradford and Associates (2002) , which find that African Americans (and in some instances Hispanics) are more likely than whites to receive subprime loans. By contrast, very few studies have examined the potential role of gender in the awarding of subprime or high-cost loans. Those that have, e.g., Fishbein and Woodall (2006) , have found that women are in fact overrepresented in the pool of subprime borrowers. In all of these studies, however, inferences about structural versus individual-level discrimination are not fully explored.
Data on the Lending Process
Although many readers may already be familiar with the lending process in the United States, a brief walk-through will help contextualize the following discussion. The steps to buying a home basically are as follows. First, prior to beginning the process, an individual (black, white, female, male, etc.) develops a certain financial profile -which includes accumulated net worth (savings minus debt obligations), yearly income, a credit score, etc. Second and third, the individual decides on a home to purchase and, at some point in the decision making process, files an application with a lending agency for approval (or pre-approval) of a mortgage loan. Once an application is filed, the lending agency must report to the federal government basic demographic information about the prospective borrower pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 ("HMDA"). The lending agency then reviews the borrower's application and either approves or rejects the application. If the application is approved, the lending agency will offer the borrower a loan with certain terms. The last step is for the borrower to accept or reject the terms of this loan. This paper uses 2006 data collected pursuant to HMDA. 2 During the height of the housing boom, data on over 30 million lending applications were recorded annually in this fashion. 3 For each lending application, the HMDA requires that lenders record data on each applicant's race, ethnicity (i.e., whether he or she is Hispanic or Latino), gender, and income to the nearest thousand. 4 Lenders are also asked to provide information on (1) whether the loan was originated (i.e., the loan was processed and the funds disbursed), (2) how much the loan was for, and (3) any applicable reasons for denial. Perhaps most importantly, lenders must report whether the loan was a high-cost loan -defined as having an interest rate greater than 3% of that offered by comparable U.S. Treasury instruments (usually 30-year Treasury Bonds). The federal government also requires that lenders report the interest rate on the loan, but only if the loan qualifies as a high-cost loan. Some summary statistics highlight the distinction between agencies that offer high-cost ("sub-2 This year was chosen primarily because of availability and tractability, and also because it represents one of the years associated with the housing boom, which lasted from approximately 2004 to 2006.
3 The HMDA was enacted by Congress for the specific purpose of detecting discriminatory patterns in the home mortgage industry. Importantly, however, the HMDA covers only those lending agencies with large mortgage portfolios. Pursuant to criteria annually issued by the Federal Reserve Bank, only lenders with home purchasing loans exceeding 10% of all loans they have issued (or $25 million, whichever is greater) were obligated to fill out the HMDA paperwork in 2006. This requirement effectively means that smaller, more specialized lenders can operate without having to disclose the kind of information mandated by the HMDA.
4 Race, ethnicity, and gender information are also collected for a co-applicant, if applicable. Table 1 : Lending Agency Distribution (by African-American customer base). The cells contain the number of lenders across the country that either had a majority white or majority African-American customer base, with the columns disaggregating whether the lending agency issued more than half low-cost or high-cost loans. Lenders that cater to whites tend to offer mostly low-cost loans, while lenders that cater to mostly African Americans tend to offer a more even mix of high-cost and low-cost loans.
prime") loans and those that do not. For example, Table 1 displays the absolute number of lending agencies according to their customer base (majority white versus majority African-American) in addition to whether they offer mostly low-cost or mostly high-cost loans. Immediately obvious is that lenders that cater to mostly whites tend to offer mostly low-cost loans, while lenders that cater to mostly African Americans tend to offer a mix of high-cost and low-cost loans. The same general trend is visible for lending agencies that cater mostly to Hispanic borrowers (Table 2) , although the disaggregation is slightly more muted.
Although copious, the data do have several shortcomings. For example, as some have observed, the definition of a high-cost loan under the HMDA is not consistent with the colloquial understanding of a "subprime" loan. This is largely an accurate critique, as the HMDA does not require lenders to report idiosyncratic loan specifics (length of the loan, repayment terms, etc.). More importantly, lenders do not need to report "private" information such as applicants' credit scores, employment histories, or debt obligations. 5 Unfortunately, even with identical incomes, property types, lien obligations, and geographical demographics, two applicants with differing credit scores will nonetheless be offered different loan products -including loans with different interest rates.
The same is true for applicants' employment histories and debt obligations. This is a key weakness that will be discussed at length in later sections of the paper. 3 Methods
Making Causal Inferences in the Lending Context
At its core, the Rubin potential outcomes framework allows us to analogize observational studies to randomized treatments. We define the outcome of interest, Y , as being whether the loan was a high-cost ("subprime") loan. 6 All things being equal, we would expect that minority borrowers, as well as women borrowers, are more likely to receive these kinds of loan.
Individual Discrimination. Most interesting (from a legal perspective at least) is whether we can estimate any potential discriminatory effects at the individual level. In this sense, we are ultimately interested in the effect of some treatment, T (in this case categorizations of race and gender), on the outcome, Y (the probability of receiving a high-cost loan). Any unit i can either be treated (T i = 1) or not treated (T i = 0). We wish to estimate the treatment effect, which we define as the difference between what we would have observed if the unit had been treated and what we would have observed if the unit had not been treated:
The "fundamental problem" of causal inference is, however, that we can't observe both Y i (T i = 1) and Y i (T i = 0). Why? Assuming mutually exclusive racial categories, a borrower cannot be perceived to be both black and white or both Hispanic and non-Hispanic. 7 Similarly, assuming im-mutable gender characteristics, it is impossible for a person to be at once perceived as both female and non-female. 8 What we observe, then, is only the result of the application of either treatment or control to a particular unit, but never both. The true treatment effect is therefore something we can never actually observe.
Because we can never observe how the same loan applicant would fare as a black person and as a white person, we must find other ways of estimating the treatment effect of racial or gender perceptions on lending. Fortunately, the wealth of data allow the use matching techniques. By dividing observations along a pre-specified set of covariates (discussed below), and pairing the observations that have identical values of these covariates, matching in this context can effectively mimic a randomized experiment. Once we have matched the data, the only difference between the treatment and control groups is that a "treatment" has been applied to one group and not the other. Matching therefore allows us to assume that, conditioning on all available pre-treatment data, the treatment has been randomized.
Readers familiar with the causal inference literature will at this point raise an important objection -the potential outcomes framework demands a neatly defined, manipulable treatment variable.
Indeed, many would contend that a treatment must be an intervention that can be easily documented and manipulated by researchers (Holland (1986) ) -for example, doing things like comparing the earnings of workers who participated in a job training program to those who did not (Dehejia and Wahba (1999) ), or comparing the life span of subjects who were given a vaccine to those who were not. In the lending context, race and gender are immutable characteristics resistant to manipulation and control. As such, modeling or conditioning on the treatment assignment mechanism is, for all intents and purposes, impossible, and any attempt to do so might introduce post-treatment bias.
Taking its cue from Greiner and Rubin (2010) , this paper moves forward taking as the treatment variables not race or gender, but perceived race and perceived gender -from the point of view of the lender. The reason why is because what we are interested in is not the lifetime impact of category was in all instances identified or perceived. 8 Contemporary gender theory, as well as the experiences of those in the transgender community, might suggest otherwise. The paper nonetheless moves forward assuming that a person may be either female or male, but not both. being born African American or being born female on a lending decision. 9 To the contrary, our interest lies in exploring potential discrimination in a lending decision. Do lenders discriminate against black or female borrowers when the applicant walks in the door? Or do they appear to target people of minority ethnic groups? The appropriate question of interest is not the cumulative causal impact of race or gender on a lending decision, but the causal impact of the lender's belief about the race or gender of an applicant. This is what we care about from a legal perspective, and this is what we care about from a policy perspective as well.
Making causal inferences at this point still requires several additional assumptions. The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) requires that treatment to one unit not affect either the treatment and/or outcome of another unit. Here, the treatments actually are "administered" independently; there is no reason to think that perception of one applicant's race or gender will impact perception of another applicant's race or gender. (There could be instances where applicants consult lenders together, but these instances are relatively rare.) More difficult is the "ignorability" assumption. Ignorability in this context would require that we include in our model all of the pre-treatment variables that could potentially affect both the probability of treatment and the outcome. (Conditioning on these variables would allow us to move forward as if the treatment had in fact been randomized.) Consider an applicant's actual race -on the surface a likely confounder.
Actual race could obviously be linked to the treatment ("perceived race"), as well as to the loan decision. On the other hand, we have good reason to think that the link between actual race and the lending decision operates through a series of financial measures (income, type of property, lien obligations, etc.) that are measured explicitly by the HMDA data. The effect that actual race has on the lending decision that is not accounted for by the financial measures would operate through the perceived race variable; the perceived race variable would in turn become be a measure of any extant impact of race -i.e., discrimination driven purely by race and not by any "legitimate" financial measures. The subject of potential unobserved confounders is discussed at length in the context of sensitivity tests, below. (2) recorded (or unrecorded) financial information, and (3) his or her being "sorted" into various lending agencies. Conditioning on available financial information, as well as the choice of a lender, allows us to measure out the specific effects that illegitimate perceptions of race (or gender) have on a lending decision. The possible influence of unobserved financial information is discussed below. Note also that failing to condition on the choice of a lender allows us to extract somewhat different causal inferences, namely the combination of individual discrimination and structural discrimination.
In this sense, the identity of the lender also plays an important role. If we believe that the predatory story is true, or if we simply believe that different people go to different lenders, then the lending outcome might be heavily influenced by a borrower's choice of bank or mortgage broker.
Specifically, minority borrowers might be more inclined to go to certain lending agencies, and these lending agencies might be the ones more likely to offer punitive high-cost loans. To estimate the role that individual discrimination might play in lending outcomes, we must therefore condition on the identity of the lending agency itself. Fortunately, the federal government records for each lending agency a unique identifier. This makes it possible to determine whether a borrower filed his or her application with lenders such as Countrywide, Wells Fargo, Washington Mutual, and a variety of regional agencies. Conditioning on this "agency ID" variable allows us to control for across-agency effects as well as to pin-point discrimination operating at the lender level. The net result is that minority borrowers are compared only to non-minority borrowers who sought the services of the same lending agency, thereby allowing us to estimate the illegitimate reliance by individual lenders on the perceived race measure.
Structural Discrimination. The methodology discussion so far has focused on determining the effects of individual discrimination. Just as individual discrimination might have resulted in inequalities in lending between minority and non-minority borrowers, it is possible -and, indeed, interesting -that minority borrowers might have been the targets of structural discrimination as well (for example, in the form of predatory lending). Blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans might have simply gone to different lenders, and differences in lender business practices (good or bad) might be driving any observed differences.
Here, we can again leverage the unique agency identifier in the HMDA data. As discussed above, if we include the unique identifier, then we have controlled for across-agency fluctuations. The end result would be an estimate of the effect of perceptions of race that constitutes impermissible racial discrimination by an individual lender. On the other hand, excluding the agency identifier allows us to estimate the effects of both individual-level discrimination and structural discrimination together. How? Under this specification, a minority borrower could also be compared to nonminority borrowers who went to different lenders. If we believe that minority borrowers were cajoled or prompted to seek out predatory lenders -ones more likely to offer toxic loans -then we would see this effect reflected in these estimates. Important to note is the fact that failing to condition on the unique agency identifier does not neatly disaggregate the two discriminatory mechanisms. What we can do, however, is to compare and contrast the results under both modeling specifications. Differences in the two results can help us pinpoint the relative impact of the two discriminatory mechanisms.
Matching Methodology. The abundance of data allowed for exact matching in all but a handful of states. 10 (Exact matching was not feasible in two low-population states, Wyoming and Montana.)
There are several advantages to matching observations exactly. First, and perhaps most obviously, exact matching is intuitive -we simply pair identical observations together and then see how the lending decisions differ. To this extent, the method produces results that are easy for lawyers, judges, and policy-makers to understand. For example, using exact matching, a borrower perceived 10 The exact matching was done with the statistical program R using code similar to that used by the Coarsened Exact Matching package (CEM), described in Iacus, King and Porro (2009). to be African-American, making $40,000 annually, looking to purchase a single-family home in Cape Coral, Florida, with a lien on it would be matched with a white borrower, also earning $40,000, and wanting to purchase a single-family home in the same neighborhood with a lien on it. Second, because the matching is done exactly, all of the covariates are perfectly identical and balanced; consequently, there is no need to check for covariate balance, as is usually required when using other matching algorithms (for example, propensity score matching or nearest neighbor matching).
Using exact matching can, however, come with costs. In this case, because we search over the data looking only for exact pairs (finding "close" pairs is insufficient), many observations will be remain unmatched. Because unmatched observations have no pair to provide a point of comparison, they are discarded in the final analysis. Matching exactly therefore discards more data than other, more flexible matching estimators. This results in higher standard errors, which in turn bring with them decreased efficiency and larger confidence intervals. Efficiency considerations in mind, the observations were matched four times, corresponding to four different "treatments": whether an applicant was (1) perceived African American, (2) perceived female, (3) perceived Hispanic, or (4) perceived Asian American. The baseline (or "control") groups were those perceived white in the case of African Americans and Asian Americans, men in the case of women, and non-Hispanics in the case of Hispanics. 11
The pre-treatment covariates (i.e., those matched on) were those taking place before the borrower filled out a mortgage application (be it a final application or an application for preapproval). These include any immutable attributes of the property, including where it was located (state, county, and census tract) 12 as well as the property type (multifamily dwelling, single-family dwelling, etc.). Also included is whether the property has a lien on it -usually an important criteria for the lending company. Other information considered pre-treatment includes demographic information about the property location, for example the population of the area, the percent of 11 "Hispanic" is considered by the federal government to be an ethnicity, not a race. Applicants were therefore asked if they considered themselves Hispanic before they were asked to identify with one of the racial categories (white, black, Asian, Native American). It was therefore possible to be both Hispanic and black or Hispanic and Asian. For the sake of simplicity, Hispanics were therefore compared only to non-Hispanics, and blacks and Asian Americans to whites. There were not enough Native American borrowers to extract useful inferences.
12 The fine-grained nature of the data allowed matching to the census tract level; matching on the census tract presumably controls for regional and neighborhood variation, including differences across communities in terms of average credit scores and employment levels.
Pre-treatment Covariates
state, type of home, type of property, loan purpose (e.g., multihome dwelling), number of occupants, county, census tract, income, lien status, population, minority population, median income, number of units, and number of family units. Post-treatment Covariates reasons for denial, the amount of loan, interest rate, "subprime" (high-cost) status, and whether the loan was subsequently purchased. Table 3 : Pre-and post-treatment covariates. The unique lending agency identifier is at times also treated as a pre-treatment covariate. Only pre-treatment covariates were matched on.
the population that is minority, and its average income. The pre-treatment variables also include any borrower attributes unaffected by the treatment, including the borrower's income. It is worth mentioning that we may or may not include the unique lending agency ID with the pre-treatment variables. We have reason to think that the identity of the lending agency is pre-treatment -after all, borrowers decide on a lender before they begin filling out the paperwork for a mortgage loan.
On the other hand, if we believe that borrowers "sort" themselves and that minority borrowers are more likely to go to certain lenders, the identity of the lending agency is not necessarily pretreatment. The paper proceeds by both matching with and without the agency ID variable, thus gaining traction on the substantive implications discussed above.
The post-treatment covariates (i.e., those covariates not matched on) are those data recorded after the lender has perceived the applicant's race or gender -in other words, those occurring after the borrower has filled out a loan application. The post-treatment variables therefore include anything having to do with the loan terms: whether the applicant was rejected or accepted, the terms of the loan, how much the loan was for, whether it was a high-cost loan, and whether the loan was eventually sold to another lender. Including these variables into the model could introduce post-treatment bias, as they have a good chance of affected by the treatment itself. This analysis will proceed looking at one of these outcomes, whether the loan originated was a high-cost ("subprime") loan.
Results
The data were matched four times, each time corresponding with one of the four possible "treatment" regimes: perceived African American, perceived Hispanic, perceived female, and perceived Asian American. In addition to these four basic matching schemes, the matching either included lenders' unique identifiers or discarded that information, thus yielding the different substantive implications discussed above. After the data were matched, subprime status, a binary "yes" or "no" variable, was regressed on the treatment variable. 13 The resulting estimate gives us the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), which in this case can be interpreted as the increased or decreased probability that the borrower in question received a high-cost loan. For purposes of this analysis, note that "high-cost" (or "subprime") refers to any loan that was (1) originated and (b) had an interest rate in excess of 3% of a comparable treasury instrument.
Individual Discrimination
Matching on the pre-treatment covariates -including on the unique agency identifier -allows us to gain traction on any possible individual-level discrimination that might be taking place.
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effect on the perceived African-American variable of 0.575, and it is significant at the 1% level with 21,238 matched African-American borrowers. Thus, African Americans -even when going to the same lender and even when displaying the same financial profiles as white Americans -are approximately 6% more likely than similarly situated white borrowers to receive high-cost loans.
Note that African Americans living in the Midwest and Northeast appear more likely to be disadvantaged, while those living in the West and, surprisingly, the South are less so.
For women, the results are striking for precisely the opposite reason. The state-by-state distribution of the perceived female treatment effect looks approximately normal and centered around zero, with a handful of states above and below. The effects for some of the states are significant, but, for the most part, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that being classified as a woman has no effect. Indeed, pooling over all of the states gives us a coefficient on the gender variable of 0.00778. Even though this is a statistically significant result (with 99,249 women in our matched sample, it is almost certainly guaranteed to be!), it is sufficiently close to zero to suggest remarkably little effect of the gender variable on the decision to award a subprime loan. The same is true for all regions of the country. This points to one conclusion: when women borrowers go to the same lenders as identically situated male borrowers, they are treated more or less the same.
The results for Hispanics are more provocative. Being categorized as Hispanic for the most part has a slightly positive effect on the probability of being awarded a subprime loan in many of the states. However, for many states, the 95% confidence bands around the estimates include zero, meaning that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no effect of being Hispanic on the ultimate lending decision. Similarly, pooling over all of the states gives a coefficient on the perceived Hispanic variable of 0.0256. Although significant (with 42,561 Hispanic borrowers matched in this sample), this is not a particularly large effect. In terms of regional variables, it appears that Hispanics living in the Midwest and Northeast are treated very similarly to other borrowers; the sole exception is the West coast, where being Hispanic is associated with an approxiate 3% increase in the probability of being awarded a subprime loan.
Perhaps the most surprising results come in the Asian-American category. The hypothesis so far has been that being categorized as a minority would, if anything, lead a borrower to have a greater likelihood of being offered a subprime loan. The data demonstrate that this is actually not the case for Asian Americans living in certain parts of the country. Indeed, with a few notable exceptions -namely Alaska -the results show that being categorized as Asian-American actually lowers the probability that a borrower will be awarded a subprime loans. The most dramatic results here come in the more rural areas of the country -Oklahoma, Arkansas, South Carolina -where being categorized as Asian-American results in an approximate 10% drop in the likelihood that a borrower will receive a subprime loan. Pooling over all fifty states plus Washington D.C. results in a slightly more modest estimate of −0.0226, but it is still significant at the 1% level. Note that Asian Americans living in the South appear to benefit the most, with an expected 3.58% decrease in the probability of being awarded a high-cost loan.
To summarize the results so far, it does appear that race factors in the decision to award a higher-cost loan. Even when matching exactly on all recorded financial information, and even when only looking at identical lenders, both African Americans and Hispanics still have a higher probability of being awarded high-cost loans in many states. Asian Americans, for their part, appear to have a lower probability of being awarded a high-cost loan. Women appear to be treated on par with men. Note that these results could still be called into question by the presence of unrecorded confounders, an issue discussed at length below.
Structural Discrimination
Because we only compared borrowers who went to the same lenders, the results in the previous section provided estimates for individual-level discrimination. In this section, we turn our attention to what happens when we match on the pre-treatment covariates without conditioning on the unique agency identifier. Leveraging the matching algorithm in this way allows us to gain traction on the Applicants perceived to be Hispanic fare better than African Americans, but there is still evidence that they are worse off than if they had gone to the same lenders as non-Hispanic borrowers.
Compared to those categorized as non-Hispanics, these applicants experience an approximate 10-20% increased likelihood of receiving a high-cost loan in a large number of states, with the worst idaho (133) newmexico (412) alaska (138) arizona (5808) dc (379) california (27869) newyork (4086) florida (31488) connecticut (1729) colorado (2072) newjersey (4863) washington (2436) massachusetts (2151) maine (47) maryland (12272) delaware (1376) nevada (3946) westvirginia (287) virginia (12516) pennsylvania (3915) kansas (731) nebraska (322) oregon (564) ohio (4189) georgia (16843) missouri (3077) texas (18912) michigan (3652) kentucky (1054) tennessee (4673) illinois (8246) oklahoma (906) northcarolina (10508) louisiana (2808) iowa (353) indiana (2167) arkansas (713) alabama (3406) southcarolina (4558) wisconsin (1176) mississippi (2133) utah (267) minnesota ( vermont (32) mississippi (302) rhodeisland (876) iowa (609) hawaii (316) missouri (1503) dc (321) kentucky (480) pennsylvania (4569) alaska (205) southdakota (100) newyork (6432) georgia (8058) california (116188) kansas (1131) maine (75) westvirginia (219) tennessee (2216) nebraska (558) newmexico (5449) texas (37450) northcarolina (5332) newjersey (7552) oklahoma (1112) northdakota (31) illinois (17948) maryland (7414) connecticut (2568) delaware (508) arkansas (831) wisconsin (1997) florida (57853) southcarolina (1641) louisiana (819) nevada (12187) idaho (1665) indiana (2032) ohio (1617) michigan (2252) alabama (736) montana (99) massachusetts (3293) colorado (7679) minnesota (1395) arizona (31731) washington (5738) virginia (9448) utah (4016) newhampshire (203) oregon ( (970) maine (2647) southdakota (1282) connecticut (8442) newmexico (5901) arkansas (3573) northcarolina (27077) newhampshire (3394) arizona (48226) georgia (37631) delaware (2913) westvirginia (2167) colorado (18725) missouri (15493) louisiana (6584) oregon (11637) rhodeisland (3028) texas (60448) southcarolina (12769) pennsylvania (25295) ohio (21359) massachusetts (14268) kansas (4967) dc (1417) kentucky (6338) florida (101531) indiana (12226) mississippi (4074) wisconsin (12629) montana (1584) minnesota (11401) tennessee (16208) iowa (5261) maryland (29299) washington (23313) michigan (20407) nevada (20855) newjersey (20819) virginia (29808) newyork (18742) illinois (41249) nebraska (2764) alabama (8629) hawaii (1802) idaho (6072) alaska (1218) oklahoma (5212) utah (9641) california (147261) northdakota ( texas (10274) arizona (5471) idaho (358) louisiana (418) florida (7383) delaware (189) massachusetts (1340) oregon (1834) oklahoma (502) connecticut (649) maryland (2336) arkansas (228) pennsylvania (2070) colorado (1942) california (33315) newjersey (3195) northdakota (22) michigan (1262) utah (901) georgia (4141) illinois (7432) southcarolina (698) kentucky (279) nebraska (254) newhampshire (139) kansas (526) missouri (747) vermont (40) newyork (2128) ohio (1221) tennessee (889) northcarolina (2352) virginia (5025) washington (5714) iowa (371) westvirginia (79) indiana (739) southdakota (36) nevada (6400) rhodeisland (142) mississippi (181) alabama (401) newmexico (586) hawaii (813) wisconsin (756) maine (63) minnesota (1416) dc (109) alaska (219) montana (32) Figure 4 : Likelihood of receiving a high-cost loan (structural-level measurements). The solid dots represent the average treatment effects for each state. In substantive terms, these are estimates of the increased or decreased probability that the treatment group in question will receive a more expensive loan. The line around each point represents the 95% confidence interval. If the spread includes the number zero, then we fail to reject the null hypothesis (at the α = 0.05 level) that there is no effect of a borrower's noted race or gender on receiving a high-cost loan. For the most part, the results suggest positive effects associated with being perceived African American, Hispanic, and female, but negative effects for being perceived Asian.
offenders being Oregon, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Arizona, and Minnesota. In fact, Hispanic borrowers living on the West coast are generally worse off, which stands in constrast with African- Table 5 : Average Treatment Effect (structural-level measurements), subprime status as the outcome variable. The total number of treated individuals is on the left, while the coefficient estimate of the treatment variable is on the right. Note that the sample sizes are approximately ten times the size of the earlier analysis, which reflects the fact that many similarly situated borrowers are in fact going to different lenders. The standard errors are reported in parentheses, although all were extremely close to zero due to the large sample sizes.
American borrowers, who are most disadvantaged in the Midwest and southern regions of the country. Moreover, for all but a handful of states with low Hispanic populations (Alaska, Mississippi, Washington DC, and Iowa) the confidence intervals do not include zero, meaning that, sensitivity aside, we can again be fairly certain that there exists some sort of positive treatment effect. Looking at the United States overall, Hispanic borrowers can expect to have 8% increased probability of receiving a high-cost loan, even when compared to exactly-situated non-Hispanic borrowers. This effect is, moreover, significant with a p-value of less than 0.01
While the picture is brighter for women applicants, they are still more disadvantaged than if they had gone to the same lenders as their male counterparts. Unlike women who go to the same lenders as men, those who go to other lenders are more likely to be offered a high-cost loan, with the effect being somewhere around 3-5%. (The strongest effects appear to be in California, Utah, Alaska, Oklahoma, and Illinois). This effect appears to be relatively stable across regions of the country and stands in contrast to our earlier analysis, in which we only looked at women borrowers who had gone to the same lenders as their male counterparts. In that case, the effect of being a woman was essentially nill. The positive effects seen here therefore lend some credence to the structural theory of discrimination.
Once again, borrowers categorized by the HMDA as Asian American present the most interesting, and perhaps unexpected, results. With the exception of Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin -where Asian-American borrowers have a higher likelihood of being offered high-cost loans compared to their white counterparts -Asian-American borrowers are either statistically indistinguishable from applicants perceived to be white (in which case the confidence interval contains zero) or, in fact, less likely to be offered high-cost loans. The trend is particularly striking in Texas, Arizona, and Florida, where applicants categorized by lenders as Asian American have up to a 10% lower likelihood than similarly situated white applicants to be offered a high-cost loan.
In fact, Asian Americans living in the South have a 6% decreased probability of getting a high-cost loan (4.65% across the country overall) and this effect is statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.01.
What the results here demonstrate is that the general impact of being African-American, Hispanic, Asian-American, or a woman is amplified when we look at the entire lending industry, and not just at borrowers who went to the same lenders. To some extent, the results provide evidence in favor of the argument that structural discrimination might be at work. After all, if there were no structural differences among lenders -and minority and non-minority lenders went to the same sorts of lenders -then the results presented in this section would look similar to the ones presented earlier. That they do not suggests that minorities do in fact go to different lenders and these lenders are more (or less, in the case of Asian Americans) likely to offer loans with harsher terms.
Sensitivity Analysis
A potential problem with the results so far is that there might exist key variables that lenders do not report to the federal government. Unfortunately for researchers, the HMDA does not mandate that lenders report data on borrowers' credit scores, employment histories, and debt obligations (as they are considered both proprietary and confidential). All things being equal, however, we might think that these financial factors could have a substantial impact on the kind of loan terms a borrower is offered. After all, even if two people have the same income and are looking to buy a home in the same area, they will be offered very different loan products if one of the borrowers has a distressed credit score or a shaky employment history. 19
One way of gaining leverage on the possible influence of omitted confounders is through the use of sensitivity tests. This paper proceeds using sensitivity analysis of the kind described by Rosenbaum (2002) , which posits that the treatment group might have some covariate (for example, bad credit scores, poor working histories, or oppressive debt obligations) Γ times more frequently than the control group. So, logically, if the treatment were truly randomized, and thus independent of all confounders, then Γ = 1. But if the treatment were applied non-randomly, perhaps due to a missing confounder, then we would expect a value of Γ > 1, such that the treatment group would be more likely to be affected by the confounder. For example, when Γ = 2, then the confounding variable is twice as likely to be present in the treatment group as opposed to the control group.
To determine the appropriate Γ values, this paper uses the specification developed by Rosenbaum (2002) and implemented by Keele (2009) . 20 For each possible value of Γ > 1, the sensitivity test recalculates the p-values associated with the treatment effect. It continues increasing hypothetically the Γ value until the p-values are no longer statistically significant. Thus, once the p-value for any given Γ exceeds 0.05 (the maximum p-value that constitutes "statistical significance" in most social science literature), the sensitivity test "stops" because it has found the level at which the treatment effect is no longer significant. This method therefore provides us with the amount of bias necessary in order for the results to be called into question.
Sensitivity analyses are relatively underused in social science research. As such, there appears to be little agreement as to what constitutes a suitable Γ value for observational studies such as this one. Rosenbaum (2005) provides some guidance, particularly with regard to experimental studies, for which Γ values greater than 3 or 4 appear to be the norm. But for observational studies, more attainable Γ values might be found in Keele (2009) , which reproduces the results of the Lalonde 19 An advantage to matching is that it allows us to account to some extent for information not reported specifically in the data. For example, we might believe that employment correlates with income and education levels, and we know that these vary from community to community. If we match on borrower neighborhoods (via the census tract variable -which is recorded by the HMDA and was matched on) then we essentially control for this regional fluctuation and thus, to some extent, control for varying work histories. Nonetheless, employment histories (and likewise credit reports and debt obligations) could still influence our results, leading us to biased estimates.
20 This paper uses a modified version of the Rbounds package (Keele (2009) Rosenbaum (2005) for the experimental studies, but, as this is the norm for observational studies, it is the general rule of thumb followed here. Tables 6 and 8 
Conclusions
The substantive results of this research are roughly threefold. The first of these is that there does appear to be evidence of structural discrimination. In particular, the data support the widely held belief that African-American borrowers were offered high-cost loans at a rate exceeding that of identically situated whites. These results are relatively robust to missing confounders, suggesting that the distribution of unrecorded data like credit scores or employment histories would have to be quite skewed in order to call this conclusion into question. There is also evidence of structural discrimination against borrowers categorized as Hispanic and, to a lesser extent, for women. These results are, however, more sensitive to potentially omitted confounders, and, as a whole, are weaker than those for African Americans.
Second, there is some some evidence, though not as strong, that discrimination at the individ- Note, however, that these effects are weaker across the board than the effects picked up by the structural-level analysis. In addition, there appear to be no individual-level discriminatory effects for being female. Finally, these effects are actually quite sensitive to potential missing confounders, and we cannot rule out the fact that missing confounders might be driving the results.
Third, Asian Americans as a whole represent a startling contrast with the other groups studied here. African Americans, Hispanics, and women are, if anything, disadvantaged by their minority status. Asian Americans, on the other hand, appear to benefit from their race. We see this effect not just when we look at Asian Americans who have gone to different lenders, but also when we narrow the scope to borrowers going to the same agencies. Although these results are in some instances sensitive to potential missing confounders, these results suggest that Asian Americans are not disadvantaged in the lending process and that there is no evidence of individual-level or structural discrimination.
Beyond the substantive conclusions, this research has several broader implications for social science research and methodology. First, the paper demonstrates a clear instance where immutable characteristics can indeed be incorporated into the potential outcomes framework. Second, the paper demonstrates that leveraging matching and causal inference techniques can be effectively used to measure different kinds of discrimination quantitatively. Here, it was the identity of the lending agency that provides the key bridge between structural and individual-level discrimination, but similar analogies exist in other areas -for example, in the education context, or in the labor setting. Lastly, the paper demonstrates how sensitivity techniques can be used alongside the potential outcomes framework in order to quantify the role that missing confounders might have on the results. This is particularly useful in cases involving racial discrimination, where necessary information is often withheld due to legal concerns. 
